COA Finds Trial Court Erred By Taking Jurisdiction Over Children And Terminating Mother's Parental Rights
COA Opinion Published: July 2, 2025 (Maldonado, Boonstra, Wallace)
COA Docket No. 371973
Wayne County Circuit Court, Family Division
Holding: Trial Court erred in terminating mother’s parental rights to her six children. The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded for further proceedings.
Facts: Mother has six children. Five of the children lived with her and the father of some of the children. One of the children, LSS, lived with her own father (Shelton), along with others in his household, including children of that father’s partner (Hamilton). One of Hamilton’s children who lived in the Shelton/Hamilton household – but not the child of Mother – was tortured and murdered by Shelton and Hamilton. In addition to LSS living in that home, two of Mother’s other children had parenting time in the Shelton/Hamilton house. Mother did not abuse any of her children, but was neglectful because she “didn’t enable the discovery of the issues which led to the tragic death of [Hamilton’s son].” In fact, she had previously reported Shelton to CPS, without result.
The trial court took jurisdiction over all six of Mother’s children because Mother did not “discover the issues that led to the death of Hamilton’s son” because she did not follow up on “red flags” about the situation in the Shelton/Hamilton household and then terminated at initial disposition.
Key Appellate Rulings:
The doctrine of anticipatory neglect cannot support jurisdiction over the children who never lived in the other home where the abuse occurred.
The doctrine of anticipatory neglect states that how a parent abuses or neglects one child is indicative of how they will abuse/neglect their other children. Mother’s three sons were not the children of Shelton. Therefore, they were never in the Shelton/Hamilton household where the abuse of the other non-related child occurred at the hands of Hamilton and Shelton. The COA applied In re Kellogg, 331 Mich App 249 (2020) to distinguish the three girls who did go to the Shelton/Hamilton house from the three boys who did not go there. It was clear error to take jurisdiction over the three boys based on the doctrine of anticipatory neglect.
DHHS was required to make reasonable efforts.
Mother’s three boys were not subject to aggravated circumstances and therefore DHHS could not avoid its obligation to make reasonable efforts to reunify Mother with her three sons. The COA has time and again reversed the trial court for failing to require reasonable efforts when DHHS has failed to demonstrate that aggravating circumstances existed.
Statutory grounds to terminate were not satisfied.
The trial court should not have terminated as to Mother’s sons, which the trial court did by relying on the neglect suffered by LSS in the Shelton/Hamilton household.
LSS did live in the Shelton/Hamilton household in neglectful conditions. However, Mother reported that father to CPS and CPS took no action. She also went to the police who told her to take the matter to court. The proofs failed to establish that there was a “reasonable likelihood” that Mother’s three sons “will suffer injury or abuse in the foreseeable future if placed in the parent’s home.”
Cautionary Note:
This appeal is about the termination of parental rights to Mother’s three sons. There does not appear to be a challenge to the termination of Mother’s three daughters – one of whom lived in the Shelton/Hamilton household in neglectful conditions and two of whom visited that household for parenting time. It is unknown if an appeal was undertaken regarding the three daughters. The cautionary note is that if a parent suspects abuse or neglect is occurring in the other parent’s household, the parent should take action to protect the children who go to that other household.
