The Michigan Court of Appeals has ruled that the notice requirement in the Mental Health Code – specifically MCL 330.1453(1) – does not apply to the initial process of obtaining mental health evaluations.

The petitioner in In re MAT (Docket No. 369255) requested mental health treatment for the respondent, his adult daughter, under the Mental Health Code, MCL 330.1001, et seq. The Washtenaw County Probate Court ordered that the respondent undergo a mental health examination. The trial court subsequently committed the respondent to combined hospitalization and assisted outpatient treatment for no more than 180 days, with an initial hospitalization period of up to 60 days.

The respondent appealed. Among other things, she claimed her due process rights were violated because she did not receive notice of the initial hearing to determine whether she needed a mental-health evaluation.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision in a published and binding opinion.

MCL 330.1453(1)’s requirement of “’notice of a petition and of the time and place of any hearing’ is part of the Mental Health Code concerning ‘Court Hearings,’ whereas the statutory provisions that govern mental-health evaluations are contained in a separate part of the Mental Health Code concerning ‘Admission by Petition,’” the Court of Appeals explained.

“Accordingly, borrowing language from MCL 330.1453(1) regarding ‘Court Hearings’ to prescribe standards for ‘Admission by Petition’ seems unwise and unjustifiable,” the Court of Appeals said. “Thus, we conclude that the notice requirements set forth in MCL 330.1453(1) do not apply to the initial process of obtaining mental-health evaluations.”

Judge Christopher P. Yates authored the opinion, joined by Judge Mark J. Cavanagh and Judge Philip P. Mariani.

No Due Process Violation

In its analysis, the Court of Appeals first addressed whether the respondent’s due process rights were violated. Because this issue was not preserved for appellate review, the analysis “is confined to a review for plain error affecting respondent’s substantial rights,” the appeals court noted.

The respondent argued her due process rights were violated because 1) she was not notified of the initial hearing to determine whether she needed a mental health evaluation and 2) no “reasonable effort” was made to secure her mental health evaluation before the trial court entered an order directing that she “be hospitalized” for the mental health evaluation after she was taken “into protective custody” and transported to the hospital.

When a petition seeking mental health treatment is filed, if the petition does not include a clinical certificate the petitioner “shall set forth the reasons an examination could not be secured” and “if the court is satisfied a reasonable effort was made to secure an examination, the court shall order the individual to be examined by a psychiatrist and either a physician or a licensed psychologist,” the Court of Appeals explained, citing MCL 330.1434 and MCL 330.1435. “If it appears to the court that the individual will not comply with an order of examination … the court may order a peace officer to take the individual into protective custody” under MCL 330.1436.

“The trial court entered such an order here,” the Court of Appeals said.

In this case, the respondent was not provided notice of the petition or the initial proceeding before the trial court conducted the hearing on December 1, 2023, the Court of Appeals observed. “During that initial hearing, respondent’s father described the efforts undertaken to obtain a mental-health examination for respondent. The trial court ended the hearing by directing that respondent participate in a mental-health evaluation. Pursuant to the trial court’s order, respondent was taken into protective custody and hospitalized for a mental-health evaluation. Days after respondent was hospitalized, she was served with the petition, a statement explaining her rights, and notice of the mental-health hearing scheduled for December 6, 2023.”

To support her due process claim, the respondent cited MCL 330.1453(1), which says the trial court “shall cause notice of a petition and of the time and place of any hearing to be given to the subject of the petition … at the earliest practicable time and sufficiently in advance of the hearing date to permit preparation for the hearing,” the Court of Appeals noted. On the other hand, the petitioner asserted this statute “has nothing to do with an initial hearing to consider ordering a mental-health evaluation, contending that the ‘Admission by Petition statutes are silent as to any required notice for the Respondent.’”

The Court of Appeals pointed out that, in prior rulings, it has observed that “[n]otice of a hearing on a civil-commitment petition is governed by” MCL 330.1453. However, “we made that observation in discussing defective notice and service in the context of a mental-health hearing, as opposed to an initial hearing for a mental-health evaluation, which is a precursor to a mental-health hearing. The two hearings are dramatically different.”

A trial court issuing an initial pick-up order for a mental health evaluation under MCL 330.1435(2) is a “streamlined process … that often involves no hearing at all,” the Court of Appeals emphasized. “Needless to say, the respondent ordinarily has no idea that such a process is underway, and a requirement of notice before issuance of a pickup order is antithetical to the purpose of that order. To draw an analogy, mandating pre-hearing notice would be similar to requiring notice and an opportunity to appear during consideration of an application for a search warrant. Beyond that, the worst outcome resulting from an order for a mental-health evaluation is detention ‘at the place of examination’ for ‘not more than 24 hours.’”

However, “the stakes are much higher” at a mental health hearing, the Court of Appeals said, citing MCL 330.1472a(1). “Significantly, the requirement of ‘notice of a petition and of the time and place of any hearing’ is set forth in MCL 330.1453(1), which is part of the Mental Health Code concerning ‘Court Hearings,’ whereas the statutory provisions that govern mental-health evaluations are contained in a separate part of the Mental Health Code concerning ‘Admission by Petition.’” As a result, using language from MCL 330.1453(1) regarding “Court Hearings” to set standards for “Admission by Petition” is “unwise and unjustifiable.”

Therefore, “the notice requirements set forth in MCL 330.1453(1) do not apply to the initial process” of obtaining a mental health evaluation, the Court of Appeals concluded.

Further, the Court of Appeals disagreed with the respondent’s argument that the trial court erred by failing to ensure that the petitioner had put forth a “reasonable effort” to obtain an evaluation before issuing a court order. “The record reveals that the trial court questioned respondent’s father many times about that issue. … When the trial court asked him whether respondent would ‘voluntarily comply’ with a court order for an assessment, or if ‘it’s going to be necessary that peace officers transport her for that evaluation[,]’ he stated: ‘I don’t know. But I would hope that she would go peacefully if you had signed a court order.’ The court then concluded that respondent was an individual in need of an ‘urgent mental health evaluation’ and ordered that officers transport her if she failed to comply. Accordingly, the trial court did not err by finding that petitioner made a reasonable effort to secure a mental-health evaluation before issuing its order. … Therefore, respondent is not entitled to any relief on this issue.”

Other Arguments Rejected

The Court of Appeals continued by denying the respondent’s various other arguments, including that the trial court:

1. erroneously conducted the mental health hearing after she had been hospitalized longer than the 24 hours allowed under the Mental Health Code.

2. improperly held that she was a “person requiring treatment” based on the testimony of Dr. Daniel Blake because “Dr. Blake relied upon respondent’s father’s biased and unsubstantiated statements.”

3. abused its discretion by ending the mental health hearing despite knowing that she had requested a jury trial.

Regarding the respondent’s length of hospitalization, the trial court record “reveals that respondent was first examined by a physician at a hospital in Ann Arbor immediately after the trial court’s order, then hospitalized the next day at Beaumont Behavioral Health and examined by a psychiatrist within an hour of hospitalization, so the trial court did not plainly err by holding respondent’s mental-health hearing on the basis of the clinical certificates because respondent’s hospitalization was less than 24 hours, as required by the Mental Health Code, MCL 330.1438 and MCL 330.1435(3),” the Court of Appeals stated.

As for the respondent’s “person requiring treatment” argument, the Court of Appeals explained the trial court found it was “satisfied” based on “clear and convincing evidence” that the respondent was a “person requiring treatment” as defined in MCL 330.1401(1)(a) and (c). “We believe that the trial court did not commit plain error. Dr. Blake ‘personally examined’ respondent before the mental-health hearing, thereby meeting the standards in MCL 330.1461(1). Dr. Blake’s examination was ‘a bit brief,’ but MCL 330.1461(1) does not prescribe the length of an examination, and Dr. Blake testified that the examination was ‘brief’ because respondent was ‘quite frustrated.’ Also, Dr. Blake relied upon statements from respondent’s father that Dr. Blake reviewed, which constituted ‘hearsay data’ admissible under MRE 1101(b)(10). Dr. Blake’s testimony clearly and convincingly established that respondent was a ‘person requiring treatment’ under MCL 330.1401(1)(a) and (c).”

Regarding the respondent’s jury trial argument, this claim “is premised on the contention that MCL 330.1458, which provides respondents in mental-health proceedings with a right to a jury trial, does not identify a time limit for requesting a trial by jury,” the Court of Appeals observed. “But the Michigan Constitution states that the right to a jury trial is automatically waived in all civil cases unless one of the parties demands a jury trial ‘in the manner prescribed by law.’ … The ‘manner prescribed by law’ is defined by MCR 5.740(B), which provides that a respondent may demand a jury trial at any time before testimony is received at the mental-health hearing. Although MCL 330.1458 does not prescribe a time limit for requesting a trial by jury, ‘[i]n instances in which a statute and a specific court rule conflict, the court rule prevails’ on ‘all matters of practice and procedure in the courts of this state.’ … Thus, because MCR 5.740(B) prevails over MCL 330.1458, and respondent requested a trial by jury after testimony was received at the mental-health hearing, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied respondent a jury trial.”

The Court of Appeals further rejected the respondent’s assertion that, if she failed to timely assert her right to a jury trial, she was denied effective assistance of counsel “because trial counsel failed to request a jury trial before testimony was received.” According to the appeals court, it could not find that counsel’s performance was deficient.

“Both respondent and her attorney were aware of her right to a jury trial,” the Court of Appeals observed. “The notice that was served on respondent two days before the hearing informed her in plain terms that she had a right to a jury trial. Counsel, by his own estimation, was involved in ‘three or four phone calls’ with respondent, her social worker, and the hospital on the eve of trial, and those calls led him to conclude that there was no interest in a jury trial. Moreover, respondent did not say a word about a jury trial until the hearing had effectively ended and the discussion had turned to a minor guardianship for her child. Thus, respondent has failed to carry her burden of establishing that her counsel was deficient when he did not ask for a jury trial at the outset of the mental-health hearing on December 6, 2023. She is not entitled to any relief on her claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.”

Accordingly, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision.